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The work presents a theoretical framework, and offers a tentative analytical framework for 
building strategies for combating systemic corruption of the kind that is observed in Ukraine.  
It  argues  that,  as  in  some  other  countries  undergoing  the  process  of  modernization, 
corruption in Ukraine plays an important social role by filling  gaps between formal (often 
impracticable) rules, and informal ones. At the same time, it creates incentives and provides 
the means for maintaining and widening these gaps, as in the critically important case of 
“capture” of the state by extorting officials endowed with abnormal administrative discretion 
and  affiliated  with  crony  businesses.  Systemic  factors  of  such  kind  make  corruption  so 
persistent and anti-corruption so necessary for development.  
Effective strategies should primarily address the real sources of corruption, and take into 
account  the  possible  side  effects.  Otherwise  anticorruption  efforts  can  bring  only  limited 
success,  and  may  even  become  counterproductive,  as  demonstrated  in  the  examples  of 
previous  anti-corruption  attempts  in  Ukraine.  Meanwhile,  prior  to  the  Orange  Revolution, 
systemic factors prevented the implementation of effective anticorruption strategies. 
In order to facilitate the creation of anti-corruption constituencies, it is proposed to classify 
the  corrupt  deals  as  embezzlement,  collusion,  overtimes,  and  extortion  based  on  the 
interests of involved and suffering parties.  
Implications  from  this  theoretical  analysis  are  combined  with  some  standard  political-
economic  recommendations  in  the  tentative  analytical  framework  for  policy  making  and 
public  advocacy.  As  examples  of  its  application,  tentative  anti-corruption  strategies  are 
suggested for some forms of corruption in Ukraine, such as capture in setting up legislation 
and  extortion  in  its  enforcement;  embezzlement  in  budget  execution,  collusion  in 
procurement and regulation, and asset stripping in state-owned firms; collusion and extortion 
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"Corruption can often more profitably be seen as one of many 
 processes of political influence than as simply the misuse  






We  present  here  a  theoretical  framework  and  offer  a  tentative  analytical  framework  for 
building strategies for combating systemic corruption of the kind that is observed in Ukraine. 
Selected  issues  of  corruption  in  Ukraine  are  analyzed  from  the  perspective  of  the 
development of such strategies, and some solutions are proposed. We do not attempt to 
develop a comprehensive program, or propose a sort of “one-for-all” remedy. To be effective, 
the strategies should be as diverse as are the forms of corruption; and the development of 
such  strategies  for  each  specific  sector  requires  the  involvement  of  appropriate 
professionals. For this reason, we omit some important issues like corruption in the judiciary 
and criminal prosecution, and we only briefly touch on issues of corruption in health care and 
education,  and  so  on. We hope that the  proposed  solutions for  some  specific  sectors  in 
which we possess relevant expertise can inspire professionals in other sectors to develop 
effective anti-corruption strategies in their spheres too.  
 





A widespread view of anti-corruption efforts is that “the government ought to fight corruption 
more harshly
1”. At least until recently, most anti-corruption initiatives on the part of both the 
Ukrainian  government  and  the  donor  community  were  concentrated  on  raising  public 
awareness  of  corruption  on  the  one  hand,  and  catching-and-jailing  selected  scapegoats, 
predominantly among low-level bureaucrats or public sector employees, on the other. It was 
assumed that the anger of the people, if stirred by “public awareness” projects, would be 
transformed  into  the  “political  will  to  fight  corruption  seriously”,  which,  in  turn,  would 
substantially increase the risk of being caught and punished, thus reducing corruption.  
However, achieving actual success in fighting corruption has been rather frustrating. The 
new government of Ukraine seems to be sincere in its commitment to fighting corruption, but 
the methods it pursues are known to be inefficient worldwide, especially in fighting systemic 
                                                            
1  “Leadership at the highest level, rather than improved legal systems or increased citizen activism, is seen as 
key to fighting corruption” (The PTS Final Report) Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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corruption.  Neither  appeals  to  morale,  nor  “replacement  of  the  corrupt  officials  with  the 
honest ones
2”, nor “catching and jailing corrupted officials every week” have proven to be 
really effective. Unsurprisingly, they have failed in Ukraine too. Moreover, even where some 
temporary success in fighting corruption has been achieved, its overall social effect has often 
been proven rather negative, as in the case of the “contraband-STOP” campaign.  
We  analyze  the  detailed  causes  of  these  failures  in  this  paper.  In  general,  “confronting 
corruption” is ineffective because corruption in Ukraine, as well as in many other countries, is 
deeply  embedded  into  societal  norms,  practices,  and  structures.  All  formal  and  informal 
institutions have become used to corruption and adapted to it
3, including the law enforcement 
agencies  that  are  heavily  corrupted  too.  Therefore,  corruption  in  Ukraine  is  systemic. 
Consequently, to be effective and successful in the long run, a good anti-corruption strategy 
should not just directly address corruption per se by increasing punishment or improving 
enforcement, but instead focus on prevention, as well as “crowding out” corruption by less 
distorting and morally harmful mechanisms, performing similar social functions. All of the 
prominent scholars and consultants on corruption issues agree that prevention is the most or 
the only effective way to fight corruption
4. Before starting to fight one must recognize the 
enemy,  however.  As  long  as  corruption  is  a  many-sided  and  systemic  phenomenon,  the 
question arises: 
 
3. Is corruption always vicious? 
 
 
Corruption as a social phenomenon exists to some extent in any state. However, as a rule, 
mature democracies as well as patrimonial societies with strong archaic traditions suffer less 
from corruption than countries “in the middle”, i.e. undergoing the process of modernization. 
For  this  reason  some  scholars  conclude  that  corruption  is  a  sort  of  “growing  pain” 
unavoidable in a certain stage of societal development. Moreover, at such a transitory stage 
it  can  play  a  positive  social  role,  sometimes  critically  important  to  the  survival  and 
development of the society
5. We focus on two such roles, which are the most important for 
our consideration. 
                                                            
2 Yushchenko’s program “Ten Steps Towards the People” 
3  Paskhaver, 2006  
4 For more arguments and evidence see, for example, the works of Spector (2005); Kaufmann (1998); Klitgaard et 
al. (2000) 
5 “… in the 1960s and 1970s, a group of scholars saw a direct link between the modernization process and 
corruption and argued that "corruption seems to exist and thrive in countries at similar stages of development 
regardless of cultural differences." (Ben-Dor 1974: 69) These "functionalists," typified by Heidenheimer (1970), 
believed that corruption helped in social and political integration during periods of great social change, and it filled 
needs not met by official means. Leys (1965) and Leff (1964) both argued that bribes can, in fact, overcome the 
obstacles  arising  from  inefficient  bureaucracy,  while  Nye  (1967)  discussed  how  corruption  can  help  political Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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First, at a certain stage of societal evolution corruption is one of the ways in which coercive 
force converts into capitalized wealth.  
In a patrimonial state, capital is a relatively less important source of wealth than power and 
coercive force. Among other things, this makes the most powerful players uninterested in 
property rights protection, thus making capitalism impossible. If, however, these players use 
their power to accumulate wealth, they eventually
6 become interested in its capitalization 
and,  therefore,  in  property  rights  protection.  But such  conversion  of power  into  wealth  is 
considered, in many cases, to be corruption. In contemporary Ukraine this historical role of 
corruption has been mostly observed in the process of privatization. 
Second, in times of rapid change, corruption fills the gap between formal and informal rules. 
In Ukraine this role of corruption is very acute and deep-rooted historically. 
Formal rules often lag behind actual social practices (under conservative regimes,  including 
the  Soviet  Union)  or  become  imposed  in  an  attempt  to  change  human  behavior  (under 
authoritarian modernization, as  of the kind undertaken by Peter the Great
7, or later by the 
Bolsheviks).  In  both  historical  cases  the  large  discrepancy  between  formal  and  informal 
arrangements have begotten too many lawbreakers to be effectively punished for breaching 
the law . 
As a result, the state officials in charge of enforcement and implementation – and, hence, 
selection of the “scapegoats” – became endowed with unusually high personal power (vlast’) 
that exceeded by far any standard degree of administrative discretion. For this reason, in the 
Russian language even the word for a state official is “nachal’nik” (the boss), and the main 
work the bureaucrats are doing is referred to as “settling the problems” (reshat’ voprosy). So, 
in fact vlast’ fills the gap between formal and actual (informal) rules. The deeper this gap, the 
larger is the scope of vlast’. 
We propose
8 to call such an arrangement the “soft rule of law”, similarly to Kornai’s (1986) 
“soft  budget  constraint”.  The  nachal’niks’  discretion  is  preferable  to  an  attempt  at  full 
enforcement  of  impracticable    and  damaging  legislation  (“the  severity  of  Russian  laws  is 
alleviated just by discretion in their enforcement”). But, as long as nachal’niks are endowed 
with  vlast’  anyway,  corruption  becomes  “second  best”,  because  it  provides  more  or  less 
efficient motivation for flexible enforcement. For instance, if firms can buy a waiver from an 
arbitrarily imposed punishment by bribing the nachal’niks in charge, then the most efficient 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
development  by  helping economic  development  …  Huntington  (1968)  argued  that higher  levels of  corruption 
coincided with rapid social and economic modernization and helped to offset some of the destabilizing factors 
brought  about  by  these  rapid  changes.  He  said  that,  even  though  corruption  tends  to  weaken  political 
development, it can also strengthen the political system by strengthening opposition parties and other institutions 
that otherwise lack access to a public life.(Marquette, 2004) 
6 Although not necessarily directly – see, for example, Sonin (2002), Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) 
7 As was explained by Volkov (2000) Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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would likely be able to survive. In the short run it is more efficient, as compared to a potential 
“corruption-free” order, under which firms, all of which have to breach the impracticable law 
as described above, would be punished randomly or totally.  
Another  important  example  is  corruption  in  health  and  education.  These  services  are 
declared to be free of charge according to the Constitution, which implies extensive budget 
funding corresponding to the high priority that the people give to these spheres. However, for 
reasons that we will not analyze in detail, officially set budget priorities were usually given to 
“national economy support” and to state capital investments. Besides, the existing system of 
provision of these services free of charge is inefficient. So, instead of contributing to the state 
budget with taxes, people pay for these required services directly but illegally. In this way 
citizens can obtain actually needed services of decent quality while still paying below free 
market prices. On the other hand, without such support, many doctors and teachers would 
lose their job motivation, which could result in the collapse of these sectors. Therefore, this 
kind of corruption fills the gap between the priorities set by the state, and the ones inherited 
in the society.  
Therefore, in many important cases corruption is not just a matter of poor morale but a 
matter of survival. Its elimination is barely possible without substantial changes in the 
economic, legal and social system. Moreover, an anti-corruption campaign may even 
be counterproductive if not accompanied by certain complementary measures aimed 
at the elimination of the real sources of corruption. 
The campaign known as “contraband-STOP” that was initiated by the government of Yulia 
Timoshenko may serve as a good illustration of the limited effectiveness of an anti-corruption 
campaign focused at corrupt practices, rather than their underlying causes. 
The legislative basis for the State Custom Service was characterized by prohibitive import 
tariffs  on  the  numerous  categories  of  goods  that  would  incur  tremendous  social  cost  if 
applied uniformly. According to the principles of “soft” rule of law the gap between official and 
actual  (much  more  efficient!)  arrangements  was  filled  with  numerous  officially  granted 
exemptions  (like  the  ones  for  “special  economic  zones”),  as  well  as  unofficial  waivers. 
Custom control is carried out on a selective basis everywhere in the world, otherwise it would 
take too much time and effort; so inspectors are endowed with large discretionary power. All 
together, these factors have created ideal circumstances for corruption. 
The campaign was targeted mainly at smuggling. Meanwhile, no measures were undertaken 
to substitute corruption in its important social role of alleviation of inefficient trade policy. As a 
result, the overall initial outcome was negative. The import of goods was largely complicated 
and  virtually  stopped  for  several  weeks;  prices  on many  goods,  primarily  meat  products, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
8 Dubrovskiy et al., work in progress Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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increased; many firms went bankrupt due to the sudden change in the rules of the game; 
lines at customs increased tremendously; and so on. Eventually, smuggling was reduced 
only to the extent that tariffs were substantially lowered. Other articles, like meat, are still 
subject to massive contraband import.  
 




The above-described “virtues” of corruption do not mean that corruption can be tolerated. 
Apart from its detrimental effect on public morale, corruption distorts incentives and leads to 
economic distortions that decrease social wealth, so its overall effect is rather negative, even 
in  the  short  run  (Shleifer  and  Vishny,  1993;  Kaufmann  and  Wei,  1999,  and  many  other 
studies
9).  
However, the net effect as well as the main winners (resisting to anti-corruption) and losers 
(most interested in fighting corruption) vary depending on the type of corruption and position 
with respect to the corrupt deal. We propose to break down the general phenomenon of 
“corruption” into four basic forms (though the lines between them are sometimes blurred), 
differing  with  respect  to  the  interactions  of  involved  parties,  and  immediate  social 
consequences: 
Embezzlement is basically a form of theft. It requires just one person with a clear antisocial 
interest  in  diverting  public  funds  to  private  use.  Most  often  such  a  crime  requires 
accomplices, but all of them have exactly the same interests. The losers are usually very 
dispersed and unorganized as they constitute the taxpayers and recipients of state services, 
thus nearly the whole population. 
Collusion is a deal between two parties, a seller and a buyer, in which both parties have 
positive  incentives.  Unlike  a  business  deal,  however,  the  corrupt  one  is  essentially 
asymmetric. A buyer provides a counterpart with some money or other form of favor at its 
own (private) expense, in exchange for the favor that the seller provides, at least partly at the 
expense of society. Therefore, unlike business deals, collusion does not usually increase 
social wealth although with important exceptions (see below). 
In  petty  corruption  (health,  education,  communal  utilities,  et.)  collusion  occurs  when  an 
employee  uses  public  facilities  free  of  charge  to  provide  private  service.  For  example,  a 
dentist in a public clinic has equipment and often some materials at his or her disposal that 
are  assigned  for  providing  free  service  to  clients.  They  can  also  be  used,  however,  for 
unofficial paid services to private clients at below market price. In fact, a client buying such a 
                                                            
9 Within this paper we do not provide a comprehensive literature review on corruption issues. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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service colludes with the dentist in using public funds. On the other hand, these funds were 
anyway  allocated  for  providing  this  kind  of  service.  So,  in  the  short  run  there  is  just  a 
reallocation of public funds (which would be spent anyway) between a dentist and a client, 
with no direct harm to public. If a dentist demands payment, it may also be considered as a 
kind of extortion (see below). Still, such reallocation may be efficient because it alleviates the 
distortions caused by the low official wages of public sector employees, who do not have 
sufficient incentives to provide high-quality services. On the other hand, poor clients who 
should be granted services free of charge may be crowded out by those who are able to pay. 
In a public procurement process, an official in charge may collude with the bidder at the 
expense  of  the  budget  by  accepting  a  suboptimal  offer.  Similarly,  a  taxpayer  and  a  tax 
inspector may collude in reducing tax liabilities.  
In  the  case  of  regulatory  capture  (or  “state  capture”)  a  businessman  (or  a  group  of 
businessmen) and a public official or politician collude in obtaining certain benefits at the 
expense of the public. It is “the perversion of the rules of the game, through corruption, to the 
benefit of the captors, rather than for society as a whole”
10. In some cases, like protectionism 
and other limitations of competition, public losses may well exceed private benefits, which 
make such kind of corruption extremely costly for a society. 
Another case of this kind is a firm preferring to pay off the inspection instead of compliance 
with some socially important regulations (environmental or customer protection regulations, 
for example). In this case, the net social outcome largely depends on the kind of regulation 
circumvented by means of corruption. 
In the civic judiciary, collusion may occur between one of the interested parties and a judge. 
The  other  party  loses  from  such  collusion  directly,  while  the  whole  society  suffers  from 
negative externalities, such as weak rule of law, mistrust in justice, and increasing inequality.  
In all of these cases the “buyer” and “seller” share some benefits at the expense of the 
public,  often  with  certain  positive  or  negative  externalities.  Importantly,  for  both  parties 
directly involved in the deal it is a positive-sum game. Therefore, building a constituency 
against collusion should necessarily involve outsiders representing the suffering third party, 
like disadvantaged customers of public services. However, in this and other cases outsiders 
suffer  from  information  asymmetry  and  coordination  problems.  Thus,  effective  strategies 
should involve the enhancement of transparency, the internalizing of externalities, and the 
facilitating of collective actions.  
However,  when  a  “buyer”  pays  for  the  circumvention  of  a  socially  inefficient  regulation, 
society wins. For example, collusion between importers and custom officers in circumventing 
trade barriers increases social wealth (and may even partly offset the effect of state capture). 
                                                            
10 Anticorruption in transition. The World Bank, 2000 Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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The main problem here is a thin and opaque line between “good” and “bad” regulations. In 
the  above-mentioned  example,  there  is  no  distinction  between  this  “good”  collusion  and 
excise tax or VAT evasion, which is certainly a “bad” collusion.  
“Overtimes” paid for additional efforts (for example, extra classes given by teachers; speed 
premiums for bureaucrats) result from voluntary deals, which – unlike collusion – seemingly 
occur not at the direct expense of the public. Thus, such kind of bribing may be efficient in 
many  important  cases.  In  particular,  it  may  increase  job  incentives  for  the  respective 
categories of public employees, and focus their efforts on the most efficient tasks.  
However, such privately paid overtimes, to the extent they substitute regular salaries, may 
distort incentives to regular work. The worse the results of regular work, the more the need to 
pay overtimes, so employees become motivated to underperform their standard job tasks. 
For  example,  teachers  offering  informal  and  well-paid  extra  classes  for  underperforming 
pupils have a reduced motivation for helping them to catch up within the regular process, 
which constitutes an important part of their job task. In the extreme case where, say, all of 
the  applicants  for  firms’  registration  offer  equal  overtimes,  they  play  a  sort  of  “prisoners’ 
dilemma” game. Eventually, all of them will be treated exactly the same way as if none of the 
applicants pay a bribe. In effect, such overtimes become a form of extortion.  
Extortion  is  a  specific  case,  in  which  discretionary  power  based  on  some  form  of  state 
monopoly (including the monopoly of coercion) is used to threaten a citizen or firm, in order 
to force them to pay off an extorter. Formally, extortion is a zero-sum transaction that occurs 
between two parties, so it cannot affect outsiders directly. In many important cases extortion 
done by bureaucrats or public sector employees looks similar to taxation, and may play an 
important role in securing descent income for these categories of employment.  
However, unlike taxation, extortion is discretionary and secret. It also requires a “stick” that 
often  does  more  harm  than  extortion  itself.  Uncoordinated  extortion  leads  to 
overappropriation (“the tragedy of the commons”), with devastating consequences (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). But an authoritarian arbiter that is required in some important cases to 
prevent such overappropriation can also suppress economic freedom, market competition, 
and abuse property rights (Dubrovskiy et al., in progress). All of these negative effects are 
magnified tremendously if the extorters “capture” the state through collusion with politicians 
or by forcing them to adopt decisions suited to extortion. Therefore, the resulting effect on 
public  institutions,  although  indirect,  can  be  large  and  even  exceed  the  effect  of 
embezzlement and collusion. Yet, this may be “efficient” in comparison to the use of force. 
As shown in the previous section, the enormous social cost of extortion may be still smaller 
compared to the case where the victim cannot “buy” a waiver, other things being equal.  
Unlike the other cases, victims of extortion are well defined and aware that they are being 
extorted, so a constituency can be built through the collective action of the narrower group. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
  13 
 
However,  the  victims  will  be  interested  in  elimination  of  corruption  only  if  the  means  of 
extortion are also removed. 
 




If corruption is indeed a sort of “growing pain” it will disappear as a result of economic and 
social progress and a special anti-corruption effort will not be required. However, there is 
vast empirical evidence that corruption can hamper such progress: a country’s institutions 
become heavily distorted and the economy declines or stagnates for decades. If the gap 
between formal and informal rules becomes too large and persists, the corruption becomes 
entrenched  and  self-supporting.  It  can  create  systemic  feedbacks,  akin  to  Polterovich’s 
(2002) “institutional trap”
11.  
The Ukrainian state used to be captured by the business-administrative groups composed of 
the extorting nachal’niks and big businessmen closely affiliated to them. This phenomenon is 
a key to understanding the nature of post-Soviet (and Ukrainian) corruption. 
Soft rule of law makes every person or firm that is subject to certain laws or regulations a 
client of the respective nachal’nik in charge of their enforcement. Nachal’niks, in turn, have 
vast opportunities to blackmail their clients in order to compel them to give bribes – hence, to 
extort  them.  Discretion  is  also  a  source  of  rent  for  the  firms  affiliated  with  powerful 
nachal’niks. On the other hand, the same vlast’, as well as bribe income, may be used for 
other  purposes,  including  to  put  pressure  on  the  legislature  by  blackmailing  MPs  and 
businesses affiliated with them or contributing to their political campaigns (Karklins, 2002). 
As  long  as  the  voters  remain  manipulated,  the  local  nachal’niks  can  use  their  vlast’  for 
electoral fraud and manipulations known as the “administrative resource”, and thus provide 
direct support to politicians. Therefore, the nachal’niks have both stick and carrot, allowing 
them to influence the rules under which they should play. This ability clearly distinguishes 




                                                            
11 It is worth noting that the particular example studied by Polterovich is not a good illustration of the theory we 
present. He argues that the vast but windfall rents begot by the, in his view, “too radical” liberalization of import in 
Russia in 1992 were partly invested in “state capture,” preventing the establishment of market institutions and the 
elimination of distortions that can generate rents; therefore, some more cautious trade and industrial policies 
would  be more successful.  However,  this  liberalization  was  undertaken  mostly  because  the  government  was 
unable to enforce the old rules, and thus insisting on them would result in massive lawbreaking and corruption. 
Moreover, protectionism and industrial policy are much more likely potential sources of “institutional traps,” as 
they certainly generate concentrated rents that could be equally used for state capture. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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Table 1: Differences between ideal (Weberian) and post-Soviet bureaucracy 
 
Ideal bureaucracy (by Weber)  Post-Soviet bureaucracy (Nachal'niks)  
Highly-paid  professional  public  servants 
facilitating rational processes of control.  
Poorly-paid public servants dependent upon 
administrative rents (in money or barter)  
No decision-making power  
Implements  legislation  in  a  strictly  formal 
(impersonal) way 
Vast discretionary power.  
Relies upon discretionary  power and vague 
and arbitrary informal rules 
Operates under constant public scrutiny and 
political oversight 
Controls  politicians  rather  than  vice  versa. 
Tries to control mass-media to avoid public 
scrutiny 
Operates  under  a  clear-cut  separation  of 
powers  
Possesses  the  political  power  to  magnify 
ambiguity and non-transparency in legislation  
Strictly  controlled  and  separated  from 
business 
Uncontrolled  and  mostly  affiliated  with 
business 
 
Unsurprisingly,  nachal’niks  use  their  power  to  shape  legislation  to  maximize  their  power 
(vlast’) and to reduce their accountability, most often at the expense of social wealth. But, as 
noted  above,  vlast’  of  the  nachal’niks  is  based  not  on  the  law  but  on  its  selective 
implementation and enforcement. Thus, they are interested in creating impracticable law – 
excessively severe, internally contradictory, ambiguous, incompatible with dominant social 
practices or even with technical constraints; not to mention opportunities for discretionary 
decisions, directly stipulated in the law.  
This  is  the  most  important,  although  indirect,  effect  of  systemic  extortion:  it  provides 
incentives and means for making legislation impracticable and, therefore, preserving 
and strengthening the basis for the whole system of vlast’ as described above. In such 
a way corruption becomes self-sustaining (this is the essence of the “institutional trap” in its 
application to this case).  
On  the  other  hand,  as  long  as  corruption  alleviates  the  consequences  of  impracticable 
legislation, it reduces incentives for its improvement. For the victims of extortion, bribing in 
each  particular  case  is  an  easier  way  of  “settling  a  problem”  than  lobbying  for  better 
legislation,  so  even  those  wrong  provisions  that  have  been  adopted  accidentally  or  by 
mistake  remain  uncorrected.  Thus,  impracticable  legislation,  discretion  and  corruption 
form a “vicious triangle” that is very hard to break.  
Besides, corruption forms specific social structures that persist over time and not only 
conduct the corrupt practices but also resist changes which could diminish corruptive 
incentives. 
Under the weak (in particular, “soft”) rule of law, weak contract enforcement requires some 
alternative arrangements, most often special kinds of social networks (in the case of the 
former  USSR  –  the  so  called  blat  networks
12)  able  to  reduce  transaction  costs.  Under 
                                                            
12  Reputation-based  interpersonal networks of  reciprocal exchange  with  “favors of  access”  (“blat” networks – 
Ledeneva, 1998) penetrated the whole Soviet society. Nowadays they still play important role as providers of 
corruption (Karklins, 2002, Ledeneva, 2000). Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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prevailing extortion such networks appear as a necessary defensive strategy used by people 
to  protect  their  interests  from  vlast’.  However,  once  these  networks  have  emerged  as  a 
means of contract protection independent of the law, such networks may equally serve to 
circumvent  any  kind  of  legislation  and  facilitate  any  kind  of  unlawful  deals,  including 
corruption. Therefore, they eventually undermine and crowd out the rule of law necessary for 
a market economy (Litwack, 1991). This is dangerous by itself because such interpersonal 
networks are widely used for trafficking, money laundering, and even terrorism.  
“Closeness” of corruption within the networks has a particularly negative effect on market 
entry. Any kind of extortion is an impediment to business since it increases the costs of doing 
business (so called “bribe tax”). While some firms have to pay significantly lower “bribe tax” 
because  they  are  better  integrated  in  the  informal  networks,  entry  becomes  effectively 
restricted  to  the  members  of  these  networks.  In  particular,  these  networks  are  the  main 
mechanism of “state capture” (Karklins, 2002; Hellman et al, 2000).  
“State capture refers to the actions of individuals, groups, or firms in both the public and 
private  sectors  to  influence  the  formation  of  laws,  regulations,  decrees,  and  other 
government policies (i.e., the basic rules of the game) to their own advantage by means of 
the  illicit  and  non-transparent  provision  of  private  benefits  to  public  officials.  …  What 
separates state capture as a form of corruption from conventional forms of political influence, 
such as lobbying, are the mechanisms by which the private interests interact with the state. 
State  capture  occurs  through  the  illicit  provision  of  private  gains  to  public  officials  via 
informal,  nontransparent,  and  highly  preferential  channels  of  access.  It  can  also  occur 
through unclear boundaries between the political and business interests of state officials, 
which have been a particularly prominent characteristic of many transition countries. In all its 
forms, state capture tends to subvert, or even replace, legitimate and transparent channels of 
political influence and interest intermediation, reducing the access of competing groups and 
interests to state officials.“
13 
Under these conditions, big business closely connected to state authorities within business-
administrative groups (BAGs) can benefit from participation in extortion (Sonin, 2002) and 
build  its  privileged  position,  largely  reducing  its  business  costs  compared  to  possible 
competitors.  Furthermore,  many  such  self-selected  nomenklatura  businessmen  are  non-
competitive on the free market. Thus, even being a victim of extortion, a business, which has 
its own stake in the system of extortion, may be interested in maintaining it, including its 
important components such as the “soft” rule of law and even weak property rights. This 
makes extortion so persistent.  
On the other hand, as long as personal vlast’ remains at the core of the whole system of 
state  governance,  it  is  very  hard  to  remove  or  restrain  it  without  at  least  a  temporary Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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deterioration in the controllability of the state apparatus. Moreover, the weakening of vlast’ in 
the hierarchical system of extortion can deteriorate the coordination of extortion, which may 
be devastating for business if not offset by some complementary actions.  
Therefore,  corruption  in  certain  cases  can  create  powerful  interests,  social 
mechanisms  and  practices  that  make  elimination  of  its  roots  difficult;  this  makes 
corruption self-sustaining. Note that the roots of corruption are often more harmful than 
corruption  per  se.  But  none  of  the  components  of  such  vicious  circles  can  be  removed 
without breaking the whole circle.  
A  self-selection  of  corrupt  individuals  occupying  respective  positions  is  yet  another 
source  of  persistence  of  both  grand  and  petty  corruption.  For  example,  imagine  that 
corruption in certain sectors (like health or education) is caused solely by low salaries: if the 
corrupt arrangement persists for a while, only those employees who can accept such rules of 
the game will remain working in this sector.  
Of course, while some of them are “greedy” and will try to extort the unofficial payments 
anyway, others -  the “honest” ones - play by these rules unwillingly. They would like to return 
to the normal way of work as soon as their salaries increase enough to provide them with a 
decent  living  standard.  However,  their  clients  (parents  of  the  pupils,  patients,  etc.)  must 
accept  the  same  rules  as  well,  and  cannot  distinguish  between  “greedy”  and  “honest” 
employees in advance, so they will offer unofficial payments to all of them and insist on their 
acceptance,  as  long  as  they  believe  that  such  payments  increase  the  quality  of  service. 
Under  these  conditions  even  “honest”  employees  will  remain  corrupt.  Besides,  there  is 
probably a psychological effect to this: it is very hard to break a moral norm for the first time 
but it becomes much easier when this “first step” has already been made.  
Among  other  reasons  for  the  persistence  of  corruption,  we  must  mention  some  cultural 
traditions inherited from the patrimonial state and archaic societies, which are treated as 
corruption in modern societies. These are various kinds of gifts that were used as signs of 
respect, as well as nepotism, and some rather minor abuses of power, like using office cars 
for  private  purposes.  The  main  problem  with  such  practices  is  that  they  are  deeply 
embedded into the culture. They are the most acute in traditionalist societies but in some 
cases (as with gifts to teachers and medical personnel; and minor abuses of privileges) they 
can be seen in Ukraine as well.  
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5. Why  were  the  effects  of  anticorruption  policies  in 




The  most  obvious  reason  is  that  the  authorities  were  not  committed  strongly  enough  to 
anticorruption, as noted above. As long as nachal'niks formed a patron-client hierarchy, it 
was plausible that the upper-most patron at the top of this hierarchy was “captured” enough 
to be motivated to preserve favorable conditions for corruption. However, this reason, even if 
true, is far from being sufficient.  
First of all, under the “soft” rule of law any kind of anticorruption policy will be ineffective 
until the rule itself is changed. 
According to Klitgaard’s (1988) famous formula:  
 
Corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability 
 
As  long  as  both  monopoly  and  discretion  are  vitally  needed  for  the  exercise  of  the 
nachal'niks’  societal  role,  accountability  remains  the  only  system-compatible  “degree  of 
freedom” for any kind of anticorruption effort. For this reason, prevention of corruption in the 
post-Soviet countries is usually understood as mostly a matter of improving accountability. 
However, although sometimes needed and mostly useful, it does not touch the vlast’, which 
is a key to extortion.  
Moreover, as long as corruption remains a part of the unofficial rules of the game, only some 
arbitrary  selected  low-level  nachal’niks  or  public  sector  employees  may  be  punished  for 
corruption. Therefore, any special anti-corruption law will be applied “softly” and will, in 
fact, only reallocate vlast’ towards higher levels of hierarchy and law enforcement agencies. 
As a result, corruption usually wins. Most often, the only visible effect is an increase in the 
amounts of bribes due to an increase in “costs” (i.e. the share that should be transmitted to 
the  top  or  to  law  enforcement)  and  risk.  Of  course,  such  an  increase  in  “price”  reduces 
“demand”, and hence to some extent can reduce the number of instances of bribing (but not 
the bribe tax).  
However, in many cases such an effect is hardly desirable. For example, when extortion in a 
certain  industry  intensifies,  firms  that  cannot  afford  higher  bribes  go  out  of  business, 
competition decreases and the product and service prices go up until they at least partly 
cover the additional costs of extortion. Besides, increasing risk further arrests corruption 
within  its  interpersonal  networks,  which  largely  magnifies  its  distorting  effects.  Thus, 
improvement  of  accountability  may  be  counterproductive  if  it  is  not  supported  by 
more fundamental changes.  Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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Under weak civic institutions some people believe that dictatorship and totalitarianism can be 
the only remedy. This is a very controversial idea. As long as the authoritarian government 
has to rely on the vlast’ of nachal'niks (and thus, extortion or clientism as described above), 
corruption  will  persist  even  if  accountability  is  improved.  Strong  authoritarian  regimes 
sometimes improve coordination of corruption (particularly, preventing “overappropriation”, 
resulting  from  uncoordinated  extortion),  and  can  succeed  in  fighting  petty  corruption. 
However, they are usually more vulnerable to high-level corruption, and can even become 
plutocratic. 
The second reason is underestimation of the systemic role and spillovers created by the 
above-described state capture by the BAGs and the extorting nachal'niks in particular.  
1.  It  undermines  the  rule  of  law,  and  in  particular  corrupts  law  enforcement,  which 
largely reduces the efficiency of any traditional anti-corruption strategies based on 
punishment and enforcement.  
2.  The  division  line  between  “neutralizing”  inefficient  and  deliberately  impracticable 
legislation, and obviously harmful collusion is unclear. 
3.  It undermines public morale, therefore facilitating the proliferation of other types of 
corruption and provides an excuse for petty corruption 
4.  State  capture  is  used  for  maintaining  non-transparency,  political  monopoly,  and 
discretion  needed  for  embezzlement  and  collusion;  it  also  stimulates  non-
transparency as a defensive behavioral strategy 
5.  It supports the emergence and maintenance of interpersonal networks of blat that 
facilitate any other kind of corrupt deals, including petty corruption. 
For all of these reasons, there is little that can be done against corruption as long as the 
state remains “captured”. However, this phenomenon is very much persistent as described 
above. Fortunately, after the Orange Revolution the situation is no longer hopeless. But one 
should derive as many lessons as possible from the failure (or sometimes – only limited 
success) of the previous attempts against corruption. 
Let us briefly analyze the anti-corruption strategies that were pursued in Ukraine from the 
viewpoint of the theoretical framework described above.  
The very first Law of Ukraine “On the Organizational and Legal Basis for the Struggle Against 
the Organized Crime” of June, 1993 stipulated that the aim of this struggle is not only the 
elimination of  organized crime but also “elimination of the causes and conditions [favorable] 
for the existence of the organized crime” (Article 2). Article 6 mentioned “discovering and 
elimination or neutralization of the negative social processes and phenomena that beget and 
facilitate the organized crime”. However, the later Law of Ukraine "On the Struggle Against 
Corruption" passed in October 1995 reduced prevention to the rules improving accountability Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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(still, due to some assessments of the legal specialists, these provisions are poorly written 
and generally insufficient).  
The current Concept of Fighting Corruption for the Period of 1998-2005 places prevention 
ahead of punishment. It also contains several references to the excessive authority of the 
state apparatus, unjustified administrative discretion, unfavorable business climate, and lack 
of accountability and transparency as the causes of corruption. Some of these provisions 
were further developed: we should admit the limitation and partial ordering of inspections; 
implementation  of  simplified  taxation  for  small  and  micro  business;  and  some  other 
measures that have indeed resulted in some decrease in corruption in the state-business 
relationships that plausibly took place by the year 2000 (see Figure 2). Still, in subsequent 
years corruption has increased again, so the Concept did not become a breakpoint in the 
overall trend.  
In  response  to  deteriorating  trends,  a  few  subsequent  Cabinet  and  Presidential  Decrees 
were passed
14 that have also contained some provisions addressing the roots of corruption. 
However,  these  points  were  diluted  among  dozens  of  other  articles.  Under  these 
circumstances,  mostly  the  punitive  measures  that  go  in-line  with  the  above-described 
traditions of soft rule of law are sometimes – selectively! – implemented; while the most 
needed laws potentially subversive to these traditions and the whole system of vlast’ remain 
idle. For example, the Law on the State Regulatory Policy adopted in 2003, obliging any 
government body to expose all of the drafts of regulatory acts to public discussion, is widely 
ignored  by  state  authorities. We attribute this  phenomenon  to the  same  soft rule  of  law, 
which largely reduces the effect of any kind of legislative anti-corruption barriers that contain 
certain requirements to the officials. 
However, in most cases “prevention” is associated with exactly this kind of measure. No 
doubt  issues  like  the  precise  definition  of  a  corrupt  deal,  the  definition  and  resolution  of 
conflicts of interest, control over the incomes of state officials, and so forth are important and 
should be stipulated by the law as soon as possible. But under the soft rule of law, these 
measures will, most probably, remain insufficient, thus having little, if any, systemic effect. 
Moreover,  when  increasing  accountability  is  not  packaged  with  a  substitution  of  corrupt 
income with legal income, it threatens the deterioration of the important social functions that 
bureaucrats carry out. Last but not least, it is also very hard, if not impossible, to build a 
winning political coalition in support of such measures as long as nachal’niks maintain their 
vlast’,  especially  in  terms  of  their  influence  on  the  legislature.  This  factor  also  obstructs 
                                                            
14 The Decree of the President of Ukraine “On The Measures on Securing Support and Further Development of 
Entrepreneurial Activity” (906/2000) of July, 15, 2000 amended by the Decree No. 477/2004 of April, 24, 2004; 
The Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the System of Measures Aimed at Removal of the Causes and 
Conditions that Facilitate Criminal Acts and Corruption” (175/2004) of February, 9, 2004 amended by the Decree Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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improvement  in  transparency  that  is  critical  for  the  prevention  of  embezzlement  and 
corruption in the process of public procurement. 
The current strategies for combating petty corruption in health and education also tend to 
underestimate its actual social role in providing job compensation to employees.  
 
7. How to fight systemic corruption? 
 
7.1. The roots of corruption must be eliminated first. 
 
Ironically,  the  considerations  presented  above  suggest  that  in  order  to  be  effective,  an 
effective anti-corruption strategy should not focus primarily on “fighting corruption” per se. 
Instead, the main effort should concentrate on measures to eliminate its institutional roots, 
searching for less distorting mechanisms of regulation and self-regulation able to “crowd out” 
corruption, or simply legalizing the accustomed social practices if they are less distorting and 
costly for the society than attempts to eliminate them.  
According to the best international experience, deregulation and simplification of rules and 
procedures are the most effective corruption-prevention measures in relations between the 
government and the private sector. Unfortunately, as these policies (simplification of taxation 
for small business, abolishment of mandatory certification and licensing of some activities, 
ordering of inspections, etc.) were not primarily targeted at anticorruption, no monitoring of 
their  impact  on  corruption  was  conducted.  But  some  indirect  and  anecdotal  evidences 
suggest  that  these  measures  have  essentially  reduced  corruption  in  these  spheres.  For 
example,  the  recent  experiment  with  implementing  a  “one-stop-shop”  in  order  to  obtain 
business permits (BIZPRO, 2005) has reduced the number of applicants reporting the paying 
of bribes to the respective offices by half or more in most cases
15. 
In the above-described case of “contraband-STOP”, the government has proposed - better 
later than never! - trade liberalization that has narrowed the gap between formal and actual 
rules. We have to admit that the crisis caused by the “contraband-STOP” campaign has 
helped in forming a winning political coalition that has successfully overcome the pressure of 
protectionist lobbies representing many important industries. The trade liberalization did not 
include, however, such crucial products as meat, sugar and cars (especially used ones). 
Along  with  other  factors,  liberalization  contributed  to  legalization  and  some  increase  in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
No. 266/2004 of March, 3, 2004; The Decree of the Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine “On the Approval of the 
Program of Development of the State Service for the years of 2005-2010” No. 746 of June 8, 2004. 
15 Interestingly, in the towns where corruption was initially high, it has been substantially reduced; while in the 
single case where it was initially low it has somewhat increased. The authors of BIZPRO report attribute this 
paradox to the effect of change in the rules of the game, which was offset, in the other cases, by their substantial 
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imports, reflected by an increase in fiscal revenues. Therefore, the combination of punitive 
and “crowding out” strategies has proven to be eventually effective. However, the social cost 
could be smaller if they would be undertaken simultaneously. 
As a side effect, trade liberalization should have reduced collusion in circumventing VAT on 
imported goods. However, for some kinds of goods the elasticity of demand is so high that 
this makes the premium for VAT avoidance big enough to counterbalance the risk associated 
with corruption. Thus, tax corruption has remained, although at a somewhat reduced level.  
In the case of culturally rooted corruption, anticorruption efforts may lead to an increase in 
the gap between formal and informal rules, and thus to a proliferation of the “soft” rule of law. 
Such  a  cost  may  be  too  high,  compared  to  potential  benefits.  For  example,  as  long  as 
everybody  is  obliged  to  bring  the  traditional  gift,  and  this  is  implicitly  assumed  in  the 
remunerations of respective categories of employees, the distorting effect of this practice is 
probably  smaller,  compared  to  the  expected  costs  of  elimination  of  this  kind  of  petty 
corruption. The best way of coping with detrimental moral effect is legalization of such small 
gifts or abuses, just as in the case of restaurant tips. The legalization could help clarify the 
distinction  between  legal  and  illegal  behavior,  thus  making  the  definition  of  corruption 
sharper.  
There are also some more radical measures that can completely eliminate the very grounds 
for this kind of corruption. For example, the deeply accustomed tradition of gifting dentists in 
public health care becomes legalized in the commercial clinics where a patient simply pays 
for medical treatment. Commercial firms legalize the private use of “official” cars by leasing 
these cars as part of job compensation to employees who need them for executing their job 
tasks.  
7.2. Take the side effects into account. 
 
Anticorruption  strategy,  as  is  the  case  with  any  kind  of  policy,  can  have  various  side  or 
external effects that should be taken into account in the process of their design. For example, 
the methods of implementation of the above-mentioned “contraband-STOP” led to delays in 
custom  clearance  of  the  cargos,  which  imposed  additional  high  (and  in  many  cases 
prohibitive)  burdens  on  importers.  So,  even  those  who  did  not  use  corruption  for 
circumventing the  tariffs  have  lost  from this  campaign,  and  therefore became  its  political 
opponents. On the other hand, in the years 2000-2001, a ban on mutual settlements and 
barter in budget and tax settlements, as well as similar measures in the energy sector, has 
increased the demand for money and allowed for the rapid re-monetization of the Ukrainian 
economy, which, in turn, has strengthened the banking system.  Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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7.3. Build a winning political coalition 
 
As in other cases, it is generally a bad idea to implement any policy without confidence that 
this attempt will succeed. A failure usually discourages voters or participants in a collective 
action,  complicating  subsequent  attempts.  This  question  is  not  specific  to  anticorruption 
campaigns, however, and thus is not the subject of detailed analysis in this paper. 
8. Analytical framework 
 
 
Based  on  the  above-described  theoretical  frameworks,  we  can  formalize  the  process  of 
analysis  of  certain  kinds  of  corruption  and  the  development  of  effective  anti-corruption 
strategies as follows: 
Step  1:  Identifying  the  roots  of  corruption  and  devising  core 
actions.  
 
1.1.  Institutional: 
Are there any circumstances that beget this kind of corruption or make the 
corrupt behavior rational? 
Yes ⇒ focus on the primary causes first (apply this framework); if this 
is impossible then be aware that success may be very limited in its 
duration and magnitude  
1.2.  Cultural: 
Are any specific cultural norms associated with this kind of corruption or its 
primary causes (e.g. gifts or expressions of gratitude)? 
Yes ⇒ legalize, to the extent possible, the least distorting among the 
accustomed  and  widespread  practices,  make  a  clear-cut  distinction 
between them and obviously illegal practices; then focus on the latter  
Intermediate result: plan of core actions  
Step 2: Identifying side effects and devising supplementary actions 
 
2.1.  Which kinds of side effects will the proposed measures create? Who are the 
tentative winners and losers from these effects?  
2.2.  Does this kind of corruption play any important social role? Could it be the 
case that certain important social functions will become non-performing should 
this kind of corruption be eliminated, other things being equal? 
Yes ⇒ Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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•  Put  forward  a  substitute  arrangement,  most  appropriate  for 
Ukrainian conditions (there should be a good choice between 
ones working decently around the world) and make necessary 
preparations for its implementation 
•  Ensure  that  core  and  supplementing  strategies  can  be 
introduced simultaneously in a package 
Intermediate result: the tentative policy package  
Step 3: The political economy issues: 
 
3.1.  What kind of constituency can be built to oppose this kind of corruption? 
a.  What  type  of  relationships  between  the  parties  to  the  corrupt  deal 
(embezzlement, collusion, overtimes, or extortion) is most applicable to 
the case in question? 
b.  How are the victims of this kind of corruption organized?  
c.  How are they represented politically? 
d.  Can the proposed policy package be presented in a politically appealing 
style that could attract more votes? 
Which kind of action is more feasible and effective: facilitation of a collective action 
(e.g. strike), or strengthening of political representation (e.g. including the respective 
priorities into the party programs)? Or, in which proportions should both methods be 
used? 
3.2.  Who is interested in preserving this kind of corruption? 
a.  How are they organized? 
b.  How  are  they  represented  politically?  Are  they  strong  enough  for 
“capturing the state” (defining the rules they play by)? 
Yes ⇒ Where is the weakest link in this vicious circle (e.g. the triangle 
described above)? 
3.3.  What are the possible legal impediments (e.g. provisions of the Constitution) 
that can be hardly overcome or circumvented in a lawful way? 
3.4.  Is  the  pro-reform  political  constituency  stronger  than  the  interests  behind 
corruption? 
No ⇒  
•  Determine  politically  feasible  steps  that  can  strengthen  pro-
reformist interest groups and weaken the opposition to reforms 
•  Be ready to seize any unexpected political opportunities (have 
law drafts and plans of action prepared) 
•  Wait for the right moment  Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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Final result: the “road map” 
 
9. Policy implications 
 
 
Application 1: Capture of the legislative process and extortion in 
legal enforcement  
 
This seems to be the most distorting among all the forms of corruption considered in this 
work due to its detrimental effects on the overall rule of law and quality of legislation. In this 
phenomenon the line between “petty” and “grand” corruption is sometimes blurred due to the 
hierarchical  organization  of  corruption  (as  in  police  and  customs  service).  This  type  of 
corruption is most severe in state-business relations, where it plays the most important 
role.  Business  is  primarily  affected  by  large-scale  extortion  because  it  is  considered  a 
lucrative  target.  On  the  other  hand,  “state  capture”  is,  by  definition,  a  state-business 
collusion. 
Among the individual respondents surveyed by the Partnership for a Transparent Society 
program (PTS)
16, more than 43% had to give a bribe in 2003 (see Figure 1), which is high by 
any standard. However, comparison of these general data with sectoral data may suggest 
that most of these respondents meant bribes given in health, education, and public utilities, 
hence unrelated to the issues of regulations and their enforcement. At the same time, among 
the  entrepreneurs  surveyed  by  IFC  in  the  same  year  (more  recent  figures  are  currently 
unavailable) as much as 72% not only had to give bribes but considered corruption as a very 
high impediment to their business. Virtually every business firm (with very few exemptions) 
has to participate in some kind of corrupt activity, which, however, do not necessarily take 
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Figure 1. “Did you personally (or your relatives or friends) give a bribe during the last year?, 
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Step 1. Impracticable legislation can be seen as the main cause of persistent extortion. So 
an effective strategy against this type of corruption should be based on deregulation, as well 
as on simplification and clarification of the remaining regulations. We just emphasize that in 
the case of Ukraine, as long as systemic corruption and soft rule of law are not eliminated, 
priority should be given to simplicity and straightforwardness of norms that would minimize 
any kind of discretion, as opposed to sophisticated norms, even if the latter are theoretically 
justified. What may be more controversial, we argue that in many cases the formal norm 
should be made closer to the common practices, even when it is considered improper. The 
actual cost of such compromise is smaller than it may appear because under the soft rule of 
law there is no reason to expect that sophisticated formal norms will be duly obeyed and can 
be  enforced  at  reasonable  social  cost.  Simplified  taxation  for  small  business  and  trade 
liberalization are the best examples of a successful approach; now there is time to change 
the  Law  on  Enterprise  Profit  Tax,  and  many  others.  The  causes  of  corruption  will  be 
addressed through depriving nachal’niks of vlast’, which is their tool of extortion. 
Small gifts should be decriminalized, as long as they remain a common practice. However, 
informal relationships between business, on the one hand, and enforcement and regulatory 
authorities, on the other, should be discouraged to avoid collusion. The usual ways of doing 
this are (i) depersonalization (for example, reporting via mail or Internet), and (ii) rotation of 
personnel  in  touch  with  business.  However,  to  be  effective,  depersonalization  requires 
dramatic  simplification  and  clarification  of  the  rules,  accompanied  by  massive  training. 
Rotation under the soft rule of law can largely increase the cost of doing business and its Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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risks. In 2002, 44.7% of surveyed managers “perceive changes of representatives of public 
authorities to have a significant impact on business success of their firms” (Akimova and 
Kuziakiv, 2003). Here we have to reinforce Step 1. 
Step 2. Given the role that organized extortion plays in the informal organization of state 
governance,  it  should  be  replaced  with  some  other  mechanisms,  primarily  democratic 
institutions. Fortunately, these are formally already in place. Another social role of extortion, 
namely providing state officials with a decent living may be substituted, in an obvious way, by 
increasing their salaries – which, however, may become politically cumbersome. 
The  most  important  expected  side  effects  would  be  a  strengthening  of  the  rule  of  law, 
decriminalization of business, and increase in competition (thus, decrease in prices). They 
are  socially  important  but  the  potential  winners  are  mostly  dispersed,  so  their  collective 
action is unlikely to happen. On the other hand, the final outcomes are politically attractive, 
so  are  likely  to  be  employed  by  political  forces.  However,  the  link  between  extortion  of 
business by nachal’niks and these potentially popular outcomes are not straightforward, so 
the  respective  outcomes  may  benefit  political  forces  ex  post  but  can  hardly  be  used  as 
electoral mottos ex ante.  
Another important side effect is a decrease in opportunities for state capture – which may 
beget powerful losers. As described above, big business is not interested in the elimination of 
extortion  as  long  as  it  belongs  to  the  BAGs.  Until  recently,  the  position  of  big  business 
(dominating the Ukrainian economy) obstructed anti-extortion efforts. Due to this reason, a 
similar kind of analysis should be made with respect to “state capture”. 
Step  1.  Its  main  cause  is  similar  to  extortion,  namely  discretion  (vlast’)  of  nachal’niks 
unchecked  by  public  oversight. The  latter factor  seems to  be essentially  weakened  as  a 
result of the Orange Revolution, which increased the chance of building a winning coalition 
aimed  at  changing  the  legislative  basis  for  both  extortion  and  state  capture  despite  the 
powerful interests behind the “soft” rule of law. 
Step  2  boils  down  to  the  nexus  between  extortion  and  state  capture  that  was  already 
discussed above. 
Thus, from a political economy point of view a chance to break the extortion/”state capture” 
network of interests looks as follows. A “pro-reform” constituency may be built from those 
who suffer from extortion more than benefit from state capture: mostly small and medium 
business not belonging to the local BAGs, and foreign investors. Wide pro-democratic and 
even  populist  forces  would  support  the  fight  against  “state  capture”.  Although  populism 
implies extortion as well, and thus should not be supported, at the initial stage it can help in 
reducing state capture. Decrease in state capture alters the cost-benefit balance of “soft” rule 
of  law  for  large  domestic  business, so  we  can  expect  an  evolution  of BAGs  into  normal 
financial-industrial groups, with the result that they join the anti-extortion constituency. The Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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threat of populism can also play some positive role in making big business supportive of the 
rule of law and strengthening property rights, as long as their selective protection becomes 
unreliable. 
Such a constituency represents a minority of the population. However, as long as the issues 
of business regulation do not directly affect the interests of larger groups, they may stay 
neutral.  In  the  meantime,  the  same  policies  (primarily  aimed  at  the  improvement  of 
legislation) can be pursued with regard to the rest of the regulations, thus benefiting wider 
categories  of  voters.  Besides,  they  will  be  assessed  ex  post,  due  to  improvement  in 
economic performance and competition.  
Moreover,  if  complementary  policies  for  partial  compensation  of  public  officials  are  well-
designed, one can expect that a considerable part of state officials will prefer regular and 
risk-free official salaries than to continue to earn higher income from corrupt practices –  and 
thus they will support the respective reforms. 
The  anti-reform  forces  were  mostly  described  above.  There  is  a  good  chance  that  the 
balance of attitudes to many corruption practices has been already changed in favor of anti-
corruption.  This  means  that  the  main  problem  now  has  a  technical  character:  too  many 
pieces of the existing legislation must be changed. To perform this uneasy task we propose 
the following approach: 
•  Put in place a filter to screen new legislation. The draft law “On the Criminological 
Expertise of the Legislative Drafts” that is currently under consideration by the Verkhovna 
Rada may provide part of a mechanism for such a filter, if issues like discretionary power, 
impracticability or selective enforceability can be considered criminogenic factors, since 
they  beget  corruption.  Similar  kinds  of  expertise  can  be  performed  by  civil  society 
institutions, especially ones representing the business community, and political parties 
seeking the support of entrepreneurs. 
•  Based  on  feedback  from  the  victims  of  extortion,  one  may  define  the  most 
problematic areas of legislation and develop respective propositions; then offer them to 
the authorities and political parties.  
•  Concentrate  the  efforts  of  non-governmental  anticorruption  organizations  on 
implementation monitoring of the laws aimed at anti-corruption prevention (as the Law 
on State Regulatory Policy) rather than particular cases of corruption themselves. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 





Application  2:  Embezzlement  in  budget  execution,  collusion  in 
procurement  and  regulation,  and  asset  stripping  (embezzlement 
and collusion) in state-owned firms. 
 
Collusion in procurement and embezzlement in budget execution are widespread, but hard to 
estimate in terms of size and effects. Indirect measures of the World Economic Forum’s CEO 
survey (GCR) suggest that, at least in the sphere of procurement, the perceived extent of 
corruption in Ukraine is not extremely high, compared to the rest of the countries covered by 
this study. In 2005 the country was ranked 47 out of 114 countries, ahead of Hungary and 
Poland.  However,  this  may  be  just  a  recent  achievement,  or  merely  an  effect  of  post-
revolutionary euphoria (the survey was conducted in spring 2005), because previously the 
same rating was 61 (2003) or 62 (2002) in a smaller sample of countries.    
According to a report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, about 7.5 billions of UAH were 
“misused”  or  “used  inefficiently”  in  2004,  which  constitutes  around  8%  of  total  budget 
expenditures or 2.17% of GDP
17. This does not mean, however, that all of those funds were 
embezzled. In some cases they were spent for purposes different from the ones stipulated in 
the budget; in some other cases violations in procurement procedures were found; frequently 
budget funds were used to provide some business firms with a sort of zero-interest loan; and 
in some cases the budget funds were just not used in a timely fashion. In most of these 
cases the net amount of actually diverted public funds is a small portion of the “misused” 
ones. Besides, the misuses are often caused by poor management rather than corruption. 
On the other hand, discovered violations may constitute just a portion of the actual ones. As 
was  reported  by  the  media,  very  large  abuses  were  discovered  after  the  defeat  of 
Yanukovich at the Presidential elections of 2004. Therefore, the total amount of damage from 
direct  embezzlement  and  abuses  in  procurement  can  be  roughly  estimated  as  a  few 
thousandth of GDP – which is still up to a billion UAH annually.  
Fraud  in  VAT  reimbursement  for  fake  export  is  another  source  of  large-scale 
embezzlement. Estimates for the volume of such fake export deals vary widely. Fraud in the 
amount of a few hundred million Hryvnyas has already been proven in the courts, while the 
amount  estimated  by  the  Security  Service  of  Ukraine  (SBU)  was  five  billion  Hryvnyas  in 
2004, which can be considered as an approximation for the upper boundary of the volume of 
fake export. Based on current VAT rates, one-sixth of this would be subject to fraudulent VAT 
reimbursement, hence embezzlement. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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The state-owned firms seem to be the most important source of this kind of corruption. The 
government as their nominal owner receives just tiny dividends (240 million UAH in 2004). 
Meanwhile, after privatization just one former SOE – Krivorizhstal’ – reported obtaining UAH 
1,864 millions
18  in net profits, of them 35% paid as dividends, which totals more than UAH 
650 millions. One can hardly believe that the efficiency of a steel mill could increase to such 
an extent within one year without any substantial restructuring.  State-owned monopolies 
such  as  UkrZaliznyts’ya,  NaftoHas,  Khlib  Ukraiyni,  UkrEnergo,  and  others  created  under 
former  president  Kuchma’s  rule,  are  frequently  accused  of  large-scale  asset  stripping, 
embezzlement, abuses of monopoly power, and using state-owned assets under their control 
for private benefit. Hundreds of millions of Hryvnyas allegedly came as political contributions 
from Ukrainian Railways (UkrZaliznyts’ya) and some other state-owned monopolies to the 
Yanukovich campaign. Unfortunately, very few, if any, of these accusations have ever been 
proven or denied in court.  
Taken together, all these forms of corruption plausibly amount to more than one percent of 
GDP. Their distorting effects, however, go far beyond this amount:  
•  Corruption  leads to  a misallocation  of  budget expenditures from  the most socially 
efficient  use  to  sectors  more  vulnerable  to  corruption  (e.g.  from  social  aid  to 
construction and other kinds of capital investment), as well as the inefficient use of 
funds within these sectors. 
•  Embezzlement  and  corruption  in  procurement  undermines  the  motivation  for  tax 
compliance, thus promoting tax evasion and avoidance, corruption in taxation, etc. 
•  Corruption in the state-owned industrial sector supports the payable political demand 
for non-privatization and preservation of inefficient management.  
•  All  of  these forms  of  corruption  create  payable  demand for  non-transparency  and 
other factors of inefficiency in the public sector.  
•  Inadequate VAT refund schemes affect honest firms and become the leading barrier 
to export with almost 70% of respondents
19 (among exporting firms rating customs 
procedures  as  a  barrier  to  business)  reporting  that  they  had  to  make  unofficial 
payments in the process of VAT refund
20. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
17 In 2003 the same indicator constituted about 2.71%, in 2002 – 2.3% 
18  Utro.ru, Nov.7, 2005. utro.ru/articles/2005/11/07/492563.shtml; UkrRudProm,  
http://www.ukrrudprom.com/news/nkrivoroj100106.html 
19 IFC, 2004 
20 As recently was reported by Yuri Yekhanurov, the Prime Minister of Ukraine, this problem is considered mostly 
solved. Of course, these recent developments could not be reflected in the earlier survey. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 




Embezzlement and collusion in procurement: Suggested remedies  
 
Step 1. Unlike previous cases, there is no factor making this kind of corruption inevitable or 
country- specific. Instead, as in any other country, the officials in charge of spending public 
funds face temptation, which is more or less balanced with the risk of being caught multiplied 
by  the  severity  of  punishment.  Thus,  in  this  case  improvement  in  enforcement  and 
punishment can be relatively more effective as compared to the other types of corruption 
under our consideration. In particular, here measures like publishing income declarations, 
assessment of estates owned by officials, etc. can be relatively more effective. 
The problem, however, is that the “broad public,” which has to act through the government as 
its agent, is the main loser from this type of corruption. But the embezzlers are much closer 
to  this  “agent”,  and  often  have  personal  links  to  the  particular  person  in  charge  of  law 
enforcement, who is often corrupt. So, it is a matter of fact that given the pervasiveness of 
this form of corruption, enforcement and punishment become subject to the “soft” rule of law. 
Therefore, transparency in possible or alleged results of corruption (the unjustified income) 
is not enough. Even though it makes collusion between law enforcement and corrupt officials 
less likely, as long as the process of control is restricted to a single General Prosecutor’s 
office, those having good personal connections to particular officers through the blat network 
of nomenklatura can feel relatively safe. Thus, the first and most obvious measure is to break 
the current monopoly of the General Prosecutor’s office of investigating criminal violations 
conducted by high and mid-level state officials by allowing other law enforcement agencies to 
prosecute such kinds of crimes if they have discovered them. Still, even if few other law 
enforcement  agencies  become  potentially  dangerous for  the  embezzlers,  prosecutors  will 
have  to  coordinate  their  efforts,  and  thus  could  be  prevented  from  interference  in  some 
cases. 
We argue that exposing the process of budget execution to wider control by means of e-
government can dramatically reduce this kind of corruption. For this purpose, we propose to 
develop a computer system that would automatically upload copies of all documents related 
to the execution of budget spending (including commercial contracts, payment orders, etc.) 
onto  a  special  website;  and  make  the  uploading  of  scanned  copies  of  paper  documents 
mandatory.  Such  a  system  should  be  used  at  the  State  Treasury,  with  possible  further 
extension  into  other  institutions  (Ministries,  State  Committees,  etc.)  responsible  for  the 
allocation of public funds. It should be also extended to the State Pension Fund and other 
social funds based on mandatory contributions; and to state-owned enterprises.  Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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This would allow the higher state authorities, as well as civic organizations, mass media, and 
private firms suffering from corruption (e.g. being discriminated against in procurement) to 
monitor budget execution. In such a way this part of e-government would make the threat of 
exposure  instantaneous,  and  deprive  potential  embezzlers  of  any  source  of  influence  on 
mud-diggers. The same computer system could be used for procurement tenders as well. 
Step 2. Just as in other cases, corruption provides officials with decent income, so anti-
corruption  policies  should  be  complemented  with  an  essential  increase  in  their  official 
income. 
The above mentioned computer system, if implemented, would substantially increase the 
internal top-bottom accountability of the executive. On the other hand, it would benefit honest 
officials because audits could be made non-intrusive and distantly performed. The auditing 
authorities, in turn, could work more efficiently and save on travel and accommodation costs. 
These virtues suggest that additional and crucially important allies can be found within the 
state bureaucracy. 
Besides,  such  transparency  would  increase  competition  in  procurement.  Among  other 
virtues, this may motivate firms currently discriminated against in public tenders to join a pro-
reform constituency. 
Among the risks, we should admit the possible abuses or incorrect use of information by 
politically engaged non-professionals and other aggressive but irresponsible actors. Some 
complementary measures should be developed in order to protect honest bureaucrats from 
false accusations based on real documents.   
The following parties may be potentially interested in the implementation of a new system: 
-  broad public (represented by civic society institutions and political parties) 
-  mass media interested in trustworthy sources of potentially acute information 
-  organs of financial control  
-  low-level bureaucrats (as of now, unorganized and not represented) 
-  private sector (currently represented by the business associations, which have not 
focused on this topic yet). 
The opposition consists of corrupt officials and their collaborators from the private sector. It is 
formally unorganized, but possesses vast political and financial assets that will be used to 
maintain the status quo.  
The balance of power with respect to this proposition is hard to predict. In order to increase 
the chances of success, it could be useful to unite potential supporters among the low-level 
bureaucracy under the motto of support for non-intrusive audit and higher salaries.  Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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Embezzlement in state-owned enterprises: Suggested remedies 
This  is  a  typical  principal-agent  problem  that  should  be  resolved  by  the  elimination  of 
asymmetry  of  property  rights.  The  enterprises  that  cannot  be  privatized  soon  should  be 
treated similarly to public sector entities (see above). Among all, such treatment will provide 
their  management  with  incentives  to  privatization,  thus  reducing  resistance.  Besides, 
privatization,  most  probably,  would  improve  the  efficiency  and  economic  performance  of 
these  enterprises.  Pros  and  contras,  as  well  as  supplementary  measures,  should  be 
considered in each particular case. 
 
Application 3: “Petty corruption”.  
 
Private price setting for publicly provided services, formally free of charge (extortion), “grease 
money”  (overtimes)  and  using  public  facilities  for  providing  these  services  privately 
(collusion) are widespread in the health sector (identified by 32.7% of respondents as the 
most corrupt sector
21), education (15.2% respectively), and communal utilities (15%), and 
probably in other public services (not asked for in the quoted survey). Although it is “just petty 
corruption” mostly caused by the understandable reason of low wages, the overall distorting 
effect may be considerable due to the following: 
•  These are the most widespread corrupt practices, thus manifesting and enhancing 
overall tolerance to corruption. 
•  Erosion of professional morale of the employees opens the way for proliferation of 
really criminal activities such as issuing fake diplomas and medical certificates. As for 
other kinds of “gray” activities, minor violations of law make more substantial ones 
psychologically easier. 
•  Although the illegal payments secure at least basic job incentives for the employees, 
their structure is inadequate.  
Particularly,  in  addition  to  general  problems  brought  about  by  collusion  and  overtime, 
corruption magnifies the conflict of interests that teachers and doctors traditionally have in 
their work. Usually teachers are responsible for evaluation and teaching at the same time; 
and doctors should perform both diagnosis and treatment. Therefore they have, in fact, to 
evaluate  their  own  work,  or  to  define  its  priorities.  Such  double  tasks  require  very  high 
professional  ethics,  which  is  undermined  by  corruption.  While  having  a  corrupt  incentive 
structure, teachers become interested in an unfairly low assessment of the wealthiest pupils 
                                                            
21 Here and after in this paragraph – according to the survey made by Partnership for a Transparent Society 
program, 2003. The PTS Final Report Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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in order to compel their parents to purchase extra classes; doctors become motivated to 
diagnose fake diseases and prescribe unnecessarily expensive treatments, etc. 
Deterioration in the quality and availability of health and education harms human capital, 
which has been so far the major competitive advantage of Ukraine. Extortion in the public 
administration undermines the legitimacy of state authorities and democratic institutions. 
 
Extortion in the public administration: Suggested remedies 
Just as in the case of “large” extortion, a reduction in discretion is the most effective anti-
corruption  measure.  However,  unlike  systemic  extortion,  with  respect  to  petty  extortion 
Klitgaard’s  (1988)  famous  formula  (Corruption  =  monopoly  +  discretion  –  accountability) 
applies in full, with direct practical implications. 
An  increase  in  the  number  of  service  facilities  (for  example,  the  number  of  cross-border 
checkpoints,  state  or  private  agencies  authorized  to  provide  registering  and  certification 
services, etc.) can substantially decrease extortion.  
Implementation  of  universal  tests  (as  currently  done  by  the  Ministry  of  Education)  and 
unification  of  requirements  is  a  general  way  of  reducing  discretion.  However,  practical 
implementation requires a great deal of creative thinking needed to eliminate the opportunity 
for discretion, for example in the process of testing. Besides, as in the case of business 
regulation, the requirements should not be put so much above the current level that such 
discretion would be treated as a mercy. 
Accountability can be improved by the so called point of service exit surveys (POSES) that 
every client of public service should be able to fill in and send free of charge via surface mail 
or the internet (Hellman, 2002). This kind of survey is widely used in the marketing of various 
services to facilitate feedback from clients. As a first step, we propose to put boxes full of 
survey postcards at the exit of every administrative building, while civic society organizations 
and state authorities would be charged with verifying that these boxes are not damaged nor 
empty. However, such postcards should not be made anonymous in order to avoid abuses. 
In  certain  specific  but  important  cases  when  clients  are  registered  anyway,  or  receive 
obligatory forms to fill in (as in the customs), the form can be amended with a short survey 
printed on the same sheet of paper, while the form should be void unless this part is cut off.  
To  the  extent  that  petty  extortion  is  used  as  a  specific form  of  “tax”  allocated  to  certain 
categories of public employees in order to provide them with decent work compensation, and 
hence secure job incentives, it should be substituted with an increase in official salaries. 
In  all  these  cases,  the  victims  of  extortion  are  natural  allies,  and  the  extorters  are  the 
opponents of anti-corruption policies. The better the political representation of the former, the ""Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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more successful will be anti-corruption policy. Thus, the strengthening of civic organizations 
should be especially effective in fighting petty extortion. 
Collusion and extortion in public services: Suggested remedies 
Petty extortion in the health and education sectors was initially caused by the necessity to 
compensate  employees  for  the  lack  of  budget  funding.  It  played  (and  to  some  extent 
continues to play until now) a vitally important social role by alleviating distortions in budget 
planning, particularly by providing additional compensation to employees and funding the 
maintenance  of  premises  and  equipment,  purchasing  materials,  etc.  It  was  also  a 
continuation of the old tradition of gifting, which was widespread in these sectors.  
Collusion, although sometimes similar to extortion (see the above example of the dentist), 
should be rather considered as a specific sort of principal-agent problem, thus attributed to 
the allocation of residual property rights (although the issues of discretion and accountability 
are still sensitive).  
Thus,  privatization  (or  at  least  commercialization)  is  the  best  way  of  coping  with  both 
problems.  It  legalizes  and  institutionalizes  payments  for  services,  largely  alleviates  the 
principal-agent  problem,  and  stimulates  efficiency.  Medical  insurance  and  student  credits 
should be put in place to enable payments for medical aid and college/university education. 
Subsidies are necessary but they should have a strictly targeted character and their size 
should be in line with the available public resources and priorities. 
The  communal  utilities  sector  is  already  half-way  to  such  an  arrangement,  with  most 
subsidies provided either on an address-specified basis, or in the form of subsidized input 
(mainly, gas) that cannot be technically allocated to other needs. The process of privatization 
is ongoing and hopefully will speed up in the course of the reforms announced by President 
Yushchenko. 
It seems that the health and education sectors should follow this way. As of now, there is a 
deep gap between fully subsidized public entities and the private ones that not only receive 
zero subsidies but also have to pay taxes (with some exemptions) for the same services they 
provide. At the same time, public schools and hospitals used to collect “gray” payments that 
are smaller than the fees paid in the private sector but collected unofficially (thus cannot be 
covered by insurance, financed by credit, or deducted from the tax base) and spent in a non-
transparent way. Tuition fees are legalized in most public universities but this practice was 
condemned  as  contradicting  the  Constitution  of  Ukraine.  However,  subsidizing  talented 
students with grants (possibly also taking into account the income status of their families), 
and compensation of bank interest for specialized education loans would be a much more 
efficient and fair way of providing the same amount of subsidies. Studies & Analyses 322 – Vladimir Dubrovskiy – Towards Effective Anti - Corruption … 
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Overtimes stem from the inefficient incentive structure for state employees (see the analysis 
above). Respectively, they should be institutionalized and legalized in the form of voluntary 
speed or quality premiums that should be converted to bonuses for employees performing 
overtimes. However, just as in the case of unofficial overtimes, the legalized ones can 
destroy  normal  job  incentives  and  become  a  sort  of  covert  extortion.  Therefore,  the 
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